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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
THEODORE LOPES, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No, 
14327 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with the crime of carrying 
a concealed weapon, contrary to the provisions of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-504 (Supp. 1975). 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
A trial was held before the Honorable Peter F. 
Leary, sitting without a jury, in the Third Judicial 
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. Appellant was found guilty as charged and sentenced 
according to law. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the 
conviction. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 1, 197 5, three officers of the vice 
squad of the Salt Lake City Police Department observed 
a "wanted" person. The person, a known prostitute, 
was riding on the passenger side of an automobile driven 
by appellant east on Second South Street in Salt Lake. 
After the officers pulled the car over (T.3), one 
officer went to the prostitute's side and another went 
to the driver's side of the vehicle (T.16/17). While 
the prositute was being placed in custody an officer 
asked the driver, appellant in this case, for identifi-
cation. The officer then ran a routine warrant check 
and found that appellant, the driver of the car, had 
a warrant out for his arrest (T.4). Appellant was 
arrested and searched and a dangerous weapon found 
tucked in the waistband of his pants (T.25) . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE VERY LIMITED DETENTION OF APPELLANT IN 
THIS CASE WAS ENTIRELY REASONABLE. 
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Appellant alleges that his stop and detention 
by the police in this case were illegal and thus that 
the weapon discovered upon his person was a result of 
an unconstitutional search and seizure. Respondent 
contends, on the other hand, that the stop of appellantfs 
vehicle was perfectly legal, that appellant was detained 
no longer than a minute or two while the passenger in 
his car was arrested, and that the police had every legal 
right to obtain additional information. Respondent 
submits that appellant's conviction should be affirmed. 
There is no question but that the stop was legal 
in the first place. Appellant was driving with a woman 
who was a known prostitute (T.5). The police had a warrant 
for her arrest and so they stopped appellant's car in order 
to arrest her (T.3,4). Appellant cites a great deal of 
authority on the restrictions placed on police in relation 
to traffic stops. However, from the facts of this case, 
it is apparant that this was not a traffic stop. The 
police stopped appellant's car to arrest a "wanted" 
person. 
Since the stop was perfectly legal, the next 
question arises in relation to the fact that appellant 
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was detained for a brief moment after the stop. The 
police asked appellant for identification and ran a 
brief routine warrant check. Appellant alleges that 
although it is permissible to ask for identification, 
the police had no right to further detain him after 
he gave identification to them. 
In a case almost identical to the present case, 
the Nevada Supreme Court ruled that a very brief deten-
tion for the purpose of a record1 scheck was entirely 
valid. The case is Brymer v. State, 528 P.2d 1025 
(Nev. 1974). Brymer was the passenger in a car that 
was driven by another. The car had no license plates. 
Police stopped the vehicle and while it was stopped 
they decided to radio the station and run a record's 
check on Brymer also. The check came back positive 
and Brymer was arrested. 
The Supreme Court has said numerous times: 
" . . . the reasonability 
of a seizure depends on a balance 
between the public interest and 
the individual's right to personal 
security free from arbitrary inter-
ference by law officers." Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
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The public, on the one hand, has a great interest in 
apprehending criminals. This must be balanced against 
appellant's right to be free from arbitrary interference. 
However, in this case, there was no arbitrary interference. 
This was not an instance where police pulled over an 
individual randomly. The officers stopped appellant 
because he was transporting a known felon. 
There is no question but that an officer could 
have arrested appellant if the officer could have somehow 
remembered all outstanding arrest warrants in Salt Lake 
City, and that one was for appellant* Since Salt Lake 
is a large city, the police keep central records and 
officers refer to the central storehouse of records. It 
is completely reasonable for the police to take one minute 
and call to headquarters for information. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has 
held that the police can detain an individual in order 
to "maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining 
more information." Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 
(1972). See also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 95 
S.Ct. 2580 (1975). In the Brignoni case, the Court also 
said: 
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"Because of the limited 
nature of the intrusion, stops of 
this sort [no search of vehicle 
or occupants, visual inspection 
limited to parts of vehicle that 
can be seen from outside, brief 
questions] may be justified on 
facts that do not amount to the 
probable cause required for an 
arrest." 95 S.Ct. at 2580. 
It is clear that the officers were within their 
**. 
rights in calling the station for more information. When 
the public's right to safety and protection is weighed 
against the very brief moment that the radio message took, 
it is obvious that appellant's conviction should be 
affirmed. Appellant was already stopped; he had to wait 
anyway while the police arrested his companion. The 
officers would have been lax indeed if they had not taken 
the time to make a quick call to the station. Public 
policy demands that they be allowed to do so. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant's stop was perfectly legal since he 
was driving with a known prostitute v/ith a warrant out for 
her arrest. It was entirely reasonable for the police 
to take a moment and make a quick call to the station. 
When that call revealed that appellant was wanted, his 
arrest and search were completely valid. 
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Appellant's conviction should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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